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Abstract 
The Turkish health care system has been subject to significant and critical changes and 
reforms since 2003. One of the important reform has been implemented in 2008 when the 
Green Card holders are entitled to the same services, without any fee, as those with public 
health insurance, such as the Emekli Sandığı, BAĞKUR, SSK. This study initially examines 
the characteristics of health insurance schemes, determinants of holding one of the health 
insurance schemes (public, private, green card, no-insurance) in Turkey. It further analyses 
the effect of 2008 reform on out of pocket expenditures (OOPEs). The study will be the first 
in the related literature analysing the effect of this reform especially on the OOPEs of green 
card holders. The analysis relies on a detailed micro-data level survey, TUİK Household 
Budget Survey, over the period 2002-2011 and employs a difference-in-difference approach 
using a pseudo-panel based on propensity score matching. Initial results show that individuals 
who have public insurance are less inclined to face out-of-pocket health expenditures 
compared to those without health insurance and the Green Card holders. However, the 
difference of the OOPEs between the public health insurees and green card holders is reduced 
after the implementation of the 2008 reform. 
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1. Introduction 
Healthcare in many developing countries, including those in Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region, is mainly funded and financed through out-of-pocket expenditures (OOPEs) 
by households (Akinci et al., 2014). OOPEs is a part of the private health expenditures which 
includes in-kind payments and perks to suppliers of pharmaceutical products, therapeutic 
appliances and other health related goods and services to health practitioners with purpose the 
enhancement of the individuals’ health status (Garg and Karan, 2009). An important policy 
for a country’s health care system is to provide financial protection from extreme OOPEs to 
assure impartial access to health care. In the absence of this policy, a household may be 
forced to spend large amounts on medical bills and treatment, and significant part of its time 
to treat and take care of a family member. OOPEs is of major concern for the policy makers, 
because of their multiple consequences to the household, the ill family members and the 
society overall.     
The main impact of OOPEs is the incidence of catastrophic health expenditures, defined by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) as exceeding the 40 per cent of the household income. 
This incidence is linked to a depraved cycle of poorness because households have to cut their 
spending on other necessities, including food, clothing and children’s education. In addition, 
the impact of OOPEs goes beyond the catastrophic health expenditures, where people do not 
use health services anymore, because they cannot afford the direct costs, including the 
expenses for medicines and consultation and the indirect costs, such as transportation (Gottret 
and Scieber, 2006; Anyanwu and Erhijakpar, 2007). Moreover, this has an additional impact 
on poverty and overall a negative effect on a country’s growth and development. Therefore, a 
concern of the policy makers is to protect people from financial catastrophic health 
expenditures. This is the first study which examines the reform of 2008 the for Green Card 
(Yeşil Kart)1 holders.  The analysis accounts for socio-economic individual and household 
characteristics, such as education, wealth, marital status and area-location of the household.  
In 2008, OOPEs were 17.4 per cent of the total expenditure on health care in Turkey 
(Turkish Statistical Institute, 2011). However, as a candidate country to European Union, the 
rate was higher than the rest of the EU countries, including Germany at 13 per cent, France at 
7.6 per cent and United Kingdom at 11.2 per cent in the same year (OECD, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the health care system in Turkey has been restructured and has undergone 
health reforms since 2003, promoting the use of technology, delivering a high quality of 
health care, which in turn have affected the OOPEs.  Apparently, the ratio was 22 per cent in 
                                                             
1
 Green Card is an insurance plan for the poor who were unable to pay for healthcare which is provided by 
government without and fee or contribution. 
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2006 and was reduced at 15.4 per cent in 2012, while the respective percentage in 2012 was 
12.9 per cent, 9 per cent and 7.5 per cent for Germany, United Kingdom and France 
respectively (OECD, 2014). To summarise, this study examines the determinants of health 
insurance schemes in Turkey, including socio-economic characteristics, barriers to health care 
access, health insurance coverage and type (social versus private) among others. Moreover, 
we evaluate the impact of the 2008 Turkish Health Reform on the OOPEs, between 
individuals who have public health insurance and those who belong in the Green Card 
program, employing a differences-in-differences (DID) framework.  
Several studies have explored the OOPEs and have also focused on catastrophic health 
expenditures (Garg and Karan, 2009; Goudge et al., 2009; Chuma and Maina 2012; Rahman 
et al., 2013; da Silva et al., 2015). Documenting the determinants of health insurance schemes 
participation and OOPEs and evaluating the specific reform of 2008 can help the policy 
makers and public authorities at achieving universal health coverage, reducing poverty and 
the inequalities in health access. The results show that the gap in health expenditures between 
the public insurees and people participating in the Green Card program is reduced.  Findings 
for a Turkish case study along with experiences from examples in other countries may 
provide guidance for policy makers to countries of the MENA region and not only.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains a brief description of the literature of 
OOPEs. Section 3 provides a brief description of the health reform of 2008. In section 4 we 
present the methodology, while in section 5 we describe the data used in the empirical work. 
In section 6, the empirical results are reported, while section 7 discusses the concluding 
remarks.  
 
2. Literature Review  
In this section we briefly present the earlier literature related to this study. Numerous 
studies found that pharmaceutical products and medical services compose the main sources of 
OOPEs (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007; Mugisha et al., 2007; Barros and Bertoldi, 2008; Garg 
and Karan, 2009). The share of those expenses ranges between 25-65 per cent of the total 
OOPEs in low-middle income countries (Wagner et al., 2007). Evidence from the literature 
shows that households in Brazil and India spend respectively the 41 per cent and 65 per cent 
of their household income on medicines (Barros and Bertoldi, 2008; Garg and Karan, 2009), 
while the share of OOPEs on medicines in Burkina Faso and Vietnam  ranges between 80-88 
per cent (Mugisha et al, 2007; Wagstaff, 2007).  Moreover, the largest inequities are reported 
for low income groups, where the poorest households spend proportionally more on 
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medicines than the richest families (Wagner et al., 2007). Knaul et al. (2006) found that 
medicines is the most important component of the health expenditures regarding the low-
income households accounting to almost 50 per cent of the catastrophic health expenditures in 
the first quintile (the poorest households), while they amount less than 20 per cent in the 
quintile of the richest households. Concluding, health systems that require lower OOPEs for 
health care offer better protection to the poor against catastrophic health spending.  
Regarding Turkey, Brown et al. (2012) examined the determinants of OOPEs using a 
Probit binary model during the period 2002-2008.  One of the most important findings of their 
research is that insurance coverage may secure households from the risky results of 
catastrophic health expenditures. In this study, we expand the period of analysis over the 
years 2002-2011, and we also take into consideration different insurance schemes.  The 
amount of OOPEs may vary according to insurance type. As Green Card holders officially did 
not have the same benefits as the enrolees in other public health insurance schemes (SSK, 
Emekli Sandığı, BAĞ-KUR) before 20082, it is more probably that they were spending more 
on OOPEs and were more inclined to face catastrophic expenditures. Brown et al. (2012) 
followed Sartori’s (2003) approach to solve the selection bias3 problem, while our study 
employs the propensity score matching (PSM) to account for selection bias as an alternative 
approach for causal inference. 
Moreover, we analyse and compare the impact of 2008 health reform on OOPEs between 
public health insurees and Green Card holders. Using the Household Budget Survey in 2003-
2006, Erus and Aktakke (2012) examined the impact of the 2003 health reforms on OOPE. 
The authors found that health expenditures are decreased and the impact varies with income 
level. Aran and Hentschel (2012) examined the impact of the Green Card program, which was 
expanded rapidly between 2003 and 2008 when the number of Green Card beneficiaries 
increased nearly four-fold. They explored the impact on the protection of healthcare 
utilization of Turkish people, defined by whether individuals decreased the use of preventive 
and curative care facilities and services. The authors found significant effects where Green 
Card holders reduced actually both forms of care. However, our study adds to the earlier 
literature by examining the effects of the 2008 health reform on OOPEs for Green Card 
holders. We apply a Differences-in-Differences (DID) analysis considering the periods before 
                                                             
2
 Prior to 2006, there were three public social security institutions in Turkey SSK (covering private sector 
employees), Emekli Sandığı (covering government employees) and BAĞKUR (covering the self-employed). In 
2006, the government merged the formal social security system under the umbrella of SGK (Social Security 
Institution). The members of the Green Card scheme have officially obtained the same benefits as beneficiaries 
in other health insurance schemes only in 2008 (Erus and Aktakke, 2012; OECD, 2008) 
3
 Selection bias problem may occur if poor households prefer do not use or do not seek health care because of 
affordability concerns. 
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and after the 2008 health reform, and the macroeconomics shocks of the economic crisis of 
2008.     
 
3. The Health Reform of 2008   
 
In Turkey the Health Transformation Program (HTP) initially took place in 2003. One 
main characteristic of the HTP is the expansion of the health coverage for the Green Card 
holders. Within HTP, health care services and pharmaceutical expenses are covered by the 
state. Moreover, the policy makers incorporated a reduction on VAT that resulted to 
significant discounts of pharmaceutical and medical products and services, and consequently 
reduced the burden for public and citizens. Overall, the HTP was successful in terms of health 
coverage expansion in the whole population, and especially the poor people. Furthermore, the 
HTP reform has considerably improved the access to health services and to transportation 
points (Chakraborty, 2009). However, a pre-requisite of the reform implementation was the 
preparation and establishment of a universal health insurance law. Within this law, all health 
insurance schemes were combined into one. While it was adopted by the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly in 2006, it was not before 2008 that its implementation officially started.  
In addition, HTP has strengthened the preventive health care, mother-child health care 
services and the family medicine program. The latter is a program which was spread out in 
the whole country and its purpose is the understanding of modern health, such as lifestyle, 
health diet and others. Furthermore, HTP tried to expand the coverage in both formal health 
sector insurance schemes (SSK, Emekli Sandığı and BAĞKUR) and the Green Card program. 
Finally, the Green Card Holders since 2008 enjoy the same benefits with the enrolees in other 
health insurance schemes.  More specifically, the contribution to the formal health sector 
insurance schemes was expanded from 59 per cent in 2003 of the population to 69 per cent in 
2008, while the number of Green Card beneficiaries was increased from 2.5 million to 9.5 
million over the same period. While previous studies so far analysed the effects of 2003 and 
2006 reforms, this paper contributes to the earlier literature by evaluating the impact of the 
2008 reform on OOPEs and OOPECTP following a DID framework. 
 
 
 
 
4. Methodology  
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4.1 OOPEs and OOPECTP 
The calculation of the OOPEs and OOPECTP involves the following steps (Xu, 2005). 
First, we calculate the poverty line (PL) and the household subsistence spending (SE). More 
specifically, SE refers to the minimum requirement for a household that is necessary to 
maintain the basic standards of living. Various poverty indicators have been developed in the 
earlier literature, but none of them is perfect. This depends on the place, location, country and 
the period of study.  However, following the methodology by Xu (2005) we use the food 
share of the total household expenditures to estimate PL. We define PL as the food 
expenditure share that ranges within the 45th and 55th percentile of the total sample. Then the 
equivalence household scale is taken: 

hh hhsizeeqsize 
                                                                                                               
(1) 
Earlier studies have estimated parameter β using household surveys of 59 countries, and 
they found it to be equal at 0.56 (Xu, 2005). The next step is to divide the household food 
expenditure ( hfoodex ) by the equivalent household size to get the equivalised food 
expenditures (eqfoodh): 
h
h
h
eqsize
foodex
eqfood 
                                                                                                            
(2) 
Next we take the food expenditure shares over the total household expenditure which range 
between the 45th and 55th percentile across the whole sample. We define them as foodex_45 
and foodex_55. In the following step, we calculate the weighted average of food expenditure 
in the 45th to 55th percentile spectrum. To get the subsistence expenditure per capita we use 
the following formula: 
5545 foodex_foodexfoodex_for
w
eqfoodw
PL h
h
hh





 
                                           
(3) 
Then the subsistence expenditure (SE) for each household is: 
hh eqsizePLSE 
                                                                                                                 
(4) 
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The household is defined as poor when the total household expenditure is lower than its 
subsistence spending (SE): 
hhh
hhh
SEpoor
SEpoor


expif
expif
0
1
                                                                                                        
(5) 
The next steps involve the calculation for OOPEs. First, we estimate the household capacity 
to pay (CTP) and we define it as a household non-subsistence spending. We have: 
hhhhh
hhhhh
foodexSEfoodexCTP
foodexSESECTP


ifexp
ifexp
                                                                           
(6) 
The out-of-pocket expenditures over the capacity to pay (OOPECTP) are defined as the ratio 
of OOPEs over the CTP and it is: 
h
h
CTP
OOPE
CTPOOPE _
                                                                                                       
(7)
 
4.2 Determinants of the OOPECTP 
In the first section we examine the determinants of the health insurance schemes. We 
estimate the following regression:  
tjhijtjtjhitjhitjhi TAAγ'yHI ,,,,,,,,,10,,, Z)log(  
                                          
(8) 
HI denotes the health insurance scheme for the individual i in household h, area-location j 
and in time t. Since the dependent variable is categorical, taking four values-public, private, 
Green Card and no insurance- we make use of the multinomial Logit model. The variable 
log(y) is the logarithm of the household income. However, the regression examines also the 
wealth index, which is expressed as a combination of material. More specifically, the index is 
a function of household ownership of a number of “goods” such a microwave, a television, a 
car, a video, a freezer, a dishwasher, central heating and second house.  Vector Z includes the 
rest of the explanatory variables, such as gender, age, education, marital status, household 
size, employment status, and others. Also, we include in the analysis barriers to health care 
access, such as the difficulties to access the health centres due to the long distance and lack of 
infrastructure and transportation. Set Aj controls for area, θt controls for time-year of the 
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survey, while AjT is a wave area specific trend which controls for time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics in the area.  
4.3 Differences-in-Differences (DID) Regression 
One issue in our analysis is the selection bias coming from the self-selection on health 
expenditures and the possible heterogeneity between individuals who have either social 
security or not. One candidate model, for addressing the selection bias, is the Heckman two-
stage procedure. This procedure consists of two equations. First, the equation that describes 
the relationship between the outcome of interest yi (i.e. the OOPEs) and a vector of covariates 
Xi, and second, the selection equation, that relates the binary participation decision into a 
health insurance program Di and a vector of covariates Zi. However, since Heckman model 
may present biases (see Elwert and Winship for more details on Heckman model and 
endogenous selection bias) we prefer to apply a propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983). There are various reasons why we have not estimated the Heckman model. 
First, in the PSM approaches, the assumption of constant additive treatment effects across 
individuals to be held is not required, as is enforced in the Heckman selection procedure. In 
this case, heterogeneous treatment effects are allowed and can be retrieved via sub-group 
analysis. In other words, the procedure involves the selection of the main groups of interest 
and then we re-apply the matching procedure within the specific group. This shows the 
flexibility of the PSM for studying and evaluating the effects of programs and interventions 
on groups of particular interest. Another important advantage of PSM is that matching 
algorithms and estimators account for the common support problem, as treatment effects can 
only be estimated within the common support. Third, PSM procedures do not require 
functional form assumptions for the outcome equation, because are non-parametric 
procedures. On the other hand, regression methods, including Heckman model, impose 
assumptions of the relationship forms which may not be always accurate or true. PSM avoids 
these restrictions and it can be useful, because functional forms are not always justified by the 
data or the economic theory (Dehejia and Wahba, 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005). The DID 
regression is:  
 
tjhijtjtjhitjhi TAAγ'ZPostTreatPostTreatOOPE ,,,,,,321,,, *  
             
(9) 
The regression is defined as in (8), while Treat is the treatment variable taking value 1 for 
those who are treated from the reform and 0 otherwise. Because the reform of 2008 mainly 
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concerns the poor and disadvantaged people, we define as the treated group the Green Card 
holders. Therefore, variable Treat takes value 1 for the Green Card holders and 0 otherwise 
(public health insurance).  Post is the period dummy, taking value 1 if the period refers to 
2008 and after and 0 for the years before 2008. The interaction term Treat*Post is the DID 
estimator. A negative and significant sign of the DID estimator, implies that the OOPEs are 
reduced in the treatment group after the reform relative to the untreated-control group. 
Moreover, the data allow us to control for the effects of the reform after the economic and 
financial crisis of 2008.   
Since the estimates may suffer from selection bias, the regressions are based on a pseudo-
panel analysis using propensity score matching and taking individual fixed effects on the 
matched sample. The reason of considering matching comes from the fact that those who are 
eligible for Green Card may have significant different characteristics than the individuals and 
their households who have public health insurance. The most important difference is the 
income, since employed and richer individuals are more inclined to public health insurance 
coverage. In addition, the two groups may be different prior to the study in other 
characteristics, including age, marital status, education and employment status. For instance, 
more educated people have better opportunities to the labour market and higher earning 
potentials that are associated with higher probabilities of having a health insurance, public or 
private, and therefore, holding a protection against OOPEs. On the contrary, unemployed and 
disabled are more inclined to belong to the low-income groups and poor social classes that are 
eligible for the Green Card program.  
Matching has become a popular approach for the estimation of treatment effects and causal 
inference. It is widely applied for the evaluation of a variety of policies and is used in diverse 
fields of studies, exploring labour, health and environmental policies.  The first problem that 
arises in many situations, including the analysis in this study, is the effect of the health reform 
of 2008 on the treated group and the investigation of the difference on the outcomes of 
interest between the treated and the control group. One very common approach is to obtain 
the mean outcome both groups or to apply a DID analysis as is the equation (9). However, we 
regard that there is a selection bias problem, as we mentioned earlier, that some individuals 
are more likely to engage in the public health insurance system for various reasons. Thus, the 
matching approach is one possible solution to the selection issue and statistical literature 
shows a close link to the experimental context. The main idea is to find a group of non-treated 
individuals (public health insurance in this case) who share similar individual and household 
characteristics with the treated or the participant in the program (the ones who are Green Card 
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holders). If this is done efficiently, then the differences in the outcome of interest of the 
selected groups can be attributed to the health reform. 
 
4.4 Propensity Score Matching  
The estimated propensity scores of the matching on participants and non participants will 
be p(x)≡P(C=1|x). Rosenbaum und Rubin (1983) show that if the Conditional Indepedence 
Assumption (CIA) holds then: 
 
   0),(|1),(| 00  CxpyECxpyE                             
                                              
(10) 
Hence, matching of participants and non participants based on propensity scores is 
sufficient. We use the Mahalanobis algorithm, while other algorithms give almost indentical 
results, including the kernel and the nearest neighbour.  Nevertheless, we discuss the 
assumptions of the matching process.  
 
Conditional Independence Assumption:  The first possible and most important 
identification strategy assumed in the propensity score matching is the CIA. This assumption 
implies that given a set of observable covariates X which are not affected by the policy or the 
treatment, the potential outcomes of interest are independent of the treatment assignment. In 
other words, CIA implies that the selection is solely based on the observable characteristics 
and that all the variables influencing the treated or policy assignment and the potential 
outcomes of interest are observed by the researcher. For the purpose of this study we assume 
that the CIA holds. The unconfoundedness is: 
XXDyy ,|, 10                              
                                                                              
(11) 
Relation (11) implies that the the potential outcomes are indepedent from the treatment 
assignment given a set of vocariates X. The unconfoundedness based on the propensity score 
can be written as: 
 
XXPDyy ),(|, 10                              
                                                                     
(12)
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Nevertheless, there are issues and drawbacks using PSM procedures. The first is the issue 
of unobservables that are not included into the matching process and into the DID analysis. 
The second is the assumption that the covariates included into the matching process are 
enough to create comparable treated and control groups. However, the majority of the 
econometric models suffer from these issues. For example, there are unobservable 
characteristics in randomized trial experiments and natural experiments. These unobservables 
then may affect the outcomes and the efficiency of the matching process. Regarding the 
second issue, many models may not control for various variables, and therefore the 
regressions may present plausible, over-control, confounding and selections biases. 
 
Common Support: This is another requirement besides the independence, which rules out 
the phenomenon of the perfect predictability of the D given a set of covariates X. 
 
1)|1(0  XDP                             
                                                                              
(13) 
 
Variable choice: Another important element of the matching process refers to the inclusion 
or exclusion of the covariates in the propensity score models. According to the CIA, the 
outcome variable of interest must be independent of the treatment conditional on the 
propensity score. Therefore, the implementation of matching requires that the set of the 
covariates X should credibly satisfy this condition. According to Heckman et al. (1997), 
omitted variables can create bias in regression estimates, and only variables that affect 
simultaneously the insurance scheme choice and the outcome variable should be added in the 
regression. The justification of the variables choice in our study comes from the fact that these 
covariates are observed before and after the participation and they can influence both outcome 
and the participation in the policy program, which is the Green Card. Age, education level, 
marital and job status and area are some of the variables used into the matching process that 
can influence both OOPEs and the program choice.  
 
5. Data  
In this study we make use of micro-level data derived from the Turkish Household Budget 
Survey (HBS), available from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIJ), over the period 2002 -
2011. The survey includes rich and detailed information for three main groups of variables: 
variables relating to household assets (e.g. type of dwelling owned, ownership of durables and 
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transportation vehicles), consumption spending (e.g. food and health expenditure), and 
variables related to individuals (e.g. age, marital status, employment status and education 
among others).  
In table 1 we present the summary statistics for the main variables of interest, such as the 
OOPEs and OOPECTP, health insurance, and for the main control variables, including 
education, marital status and household income among others. In panel A of the table 1 the 
continuous variables are shown. We should notice that there are extreme values, regarding 
household income, as it can be seen by the minimum and maximum values. Nevertheless, 
after the PSM procedure the maximum value is reduced at 200,000 TL. The majority of the 
sample has public health insurance at 63.10%, while only 6.76% is privately insured. A high 
percentage of the population is Green Card holders at 13.24% and the 16.91% has no health 
insurance. The 64.98 per cent of the sample is married followed by the singles at 28.95 per 
cent. Also, we should note that the minimum respondent’s age included in the analysis is 15 
years old.  The majority of the people have completed at maximum the primary school, while 
only the 4.25 per cent has finished a university degree. Most of the respondents stated that do 
not confront limited activities to work or to activities they usually do because of mental or 
physical health problems at 94.74 per cent. We observe that almost the 70 per cent of the 
sample finds the access to health centres and transportation points easy. 
In table 2 we show the associations among the main variables of interest. We observe that 
household income is positively related to both private and public health insurance schemes 
and negatively to Green Card holders and no-insured respondents. From table 2 we can 
conclude that the educated and wealthier households are more likely to have either a public of 
private health insurance. Regarding the household size, we observe a negative relationship 
with the education income and the participation in the public or private insurance scheme. On 
the contrary, a positive correlation between the family size, the Green Card scheme and no 
health insurance is illustrated. Similarly, we can see that the wealthier households and the 
more educated people are located in the urban areas. Also, the household size is smaller in the 
urban areas. From the above associations we overall conclude that richer, more educated 
people, located in urban areas are more likely to have social security, public or private, as 
usually those areas offer more labour opportunities, especially for educated people, and higher 
earning potentials, expressed by the household income. Following the earlier literature (Van 
Doorslaer et al., 2007; Mugisha et al., 2007; Barros and Bertoldi, 2008; Erus and Aktakke, 
2012; Brown et al., 2014) the regressions control for various individual and household 
characteristics, including gender, age, education level, household income, marital and job 
status, occupation industry code, rural versus urban area, difficulties in access to 
13 
 
transportation points and health centres. These controls are useful, since they may cause the 
capability and the decision of a person or household to participate in a specific type of health 
insurance.  
 
(Insert Tables 1-2) 
 
6. Empirical Results   
6.1 Determinants of Health Insurance Schemes 
 
In this section we present the empirical results about the determinants of the health 
insurance scheme selection. In table 3 we report the Multinomial Logit model (8) estimates 
choosing as a base reference the public health insurance, since is the most frequent category. 
Therefore, the coefficients are interpreted as probability occurrences of participating in a 
specific health insurance scheme in relation to the base category, which is the public health 
insurance. Gender is not significant regarding the choice between public and private, but 
women are less likely to have no insurance or are less likely to be Green Card holders 
according to columns (2)-(3). This can be explained by the fact that even women who are not 
employed are entitled to public health coverage through the employment status of their 
husbands. Taking the exponential of the coefficients we find that the probability that women 
will participate in the Green Card scheme or to non-health insurance is lower by 0.58-0.60 
relative to the males, keeping all the other variables constant. A similar interpretation is 
followed for the remained coefficients. For instance, the education coefficients are 
insignificant for the private insurance, implying that the education level between the public 
and the private health insurees is not different. On the other hand, the education coefficients 
are significant and negative in the case of Green Card and no-insurance and the relationship is 
monotonic. This indicates that more educated people are less likely to be uninsured or to 
participate in the Green Card scheme relative to the illiterate people. The same holds for the 
wealthier households, and the households that are located in urban areas and their access to 
health services and transportation points is easy. The latter can be explained by its 
interrelationship with urban area where generally the access is easier and there is a variety of 
health supply options. We observe a negative relationship for the widowed, while a positive 
relationship is shown for the divorced people, implying that are more likely to choose the 
private, Green Card scheme or be uninsured than the reference category, which is the singles. 
Nevertheless, there is a strong heterogeneity among the samples examined as it was expected. 
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We derive the same conclusion for the household size. Regarding the employment status we 
see that is significant only in the case of the Green Card and it is positive. This shows that 
unemployed people are more likely to belong to the Green cad scheme compared with the 
employed. The results overall are consistent with the study by Brown et al. (2014); however 
our analysis is expanded in such a way that we explore all the health insurance types, 
including the accessibility to health centres and transportation and wealth. Moreover, we 
extend our analysis using a DID approach to evaluate the effectiveness of the health reform of 
2008. We considered various algorithms, including kernel and nearest neighbour, and the 
results remain robust. In this study the matched sample employed has been derived by the 
Mahalanobis metric algorithm. 
 
(Insert Table 3) 
In table 4 we present the average Treatment Effects on OOPEs and OOPECTP using the 
matched sample after the PSM procedure. We observe that while married individuals and 
wealthier households spend more on OOPEs, expressed by the household income and wealth 
index, they spend less on OOPECTP, indicating that have more capacity and capabilities to 
afford the health related expenses. On the other hand, widowed and divorced spend on 
average more on OOPECTP, showing that are more vulnerable groups than married and 
singles and they need more attention and protection against health related costs. The 
education is insignificant regarding the regression of OOPE, but it becomes negative and 
significant in the case of OOPECTP and it illustrates a monotonic relationship. This is in line 
with the wealth, where more educated people have more earning potentials than uneducated 
and poorer social groups. The same holds for the unemployed individuals, who spend more on 
both OOPEs and OOPECTP. Green Card holders overall pay more on both OOPEs and 
OOPECTP than the public health insurees over the period we examine.  In table 5, the 
average effects of other health insurance scheme groups are reported.  The results show that 
those who have a private health insurance spend on average 14 Turkish Liras (TL) more than 
those with public health coverage, while those without health insurance coverage pay on 
average 6 TL more than the respondents who have either public or private health insurance. In 
addition, the OOPECTP levels are higher for uninsured people. On the other hand, the Green 
Card holders spend lower amounts on OOPECTP than the uninsured respondents by 12.5 TL.  
We should notice that we do not show the estimated coefficients for the rest of the socio-
economic factors, as we presented them in table 4, because the conclusions remain the same.  
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(Insert Tables 4-5) 
In table 6 the test of the propensity score matching considering various health insurance 
classes are reported. In the majority of the estimates the groups share similar characteristics. 
However, the marital status is significantly different among the groups examined, except for 
the Green Card holders versus those with no health insurance. Other differences include the 
education level in the no insurance versus private-public groups and the urban area in the no 
insurance versus Green Card groups. The propensity score matching results follow the CIA, 
as we discussed earlier in the methodology section and it is based on the observable variables. 
However, we should note that the matching process is associated with drawbacks, since the 
individuals-agents may choose the insurance type based on unobservable characteristics like 
trust, quality of family support, relations and togetherness and the individual and family 
medical history, which information is not available in the survey. Nevertheless, the estimates 
are not significantly different with the unmatched sample, as the analysis is relied on a quasi-
experimental approach, which is the health reform of 2008. Moreover, this approach along 
with the randomized trial experiments and the natural experiments present the common 
problems related to the difficulty of accounting also for unobservable characteristics. 
 (Insert Table 6) 
 
6.2 Differences-in-Differences (DID) on Health Reforms 
 
In this section, we show the estimates of the DID framework which is applied to evaluate 
the effects of 2008 health reform. The treatment group is the Green Card holders, while the 
control group includes those who have public health insurance. We should note that those 
who are uninsured or have private health coverage are not included, because the health reform 
in 2008 refers to changes that are applied to Green Card holders, who are entitled to the same 
services and benefits with those who have public health insurance coverage (OECD, 2008). In 
panels A and B of table 7 we report the DID estimates respectively for the OOPECTP and 
OOPEs. In both cases, the results show that there is no difference between the treated and 
control group. While the OOPEs increased after 2007, a decrease in OOPECTP is recorded. 
Overall, an increase on health expenditures may mark a risk, but the increase of OOPECTP is 
more crucial, since it signals the capacity or capability of the household to meet the health 
related costs. In other words, an increase of OOPEs does not always imply a risk, as long as, 
the household is capable to meet the expenses. Concluding in both cases, the OOPECTP and 
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OOPEs levels between the treated and the control group are reduced due to the health reform 
of 2008. In addition, in panels C and D we present the placebo tests for the DID, taking 2007 
as the placebo year, implying that our estimates are robust, since the DID coefficient is 
insignificant. The same conclusions are derived if we set up 2006 or another year as placebo.  
 
(Insert Table 7) 
In figures 1-2 we illustrate the parallel trend assumption respectively for OOPEs and 
OOPECTP. The figures confirm our estimates. For instance, we saw an increasing trend for 
OOPEs after 2007 which is suggested by the line for the control group which is increasing 
after 2007. However, as we can observe in figure 2, the OOPECTP actually decrease, 
especially in the treated group.  
In figure 3 we present the histogram for the OOPEs. It becomes obvious that the 
distribution is skewed, while the histogram for the logarithm of the OOPEs is presented in 
figure 4. Similarly, the same conclusion is derived by the figures 5-6 for the OOPEs over the 
capacity to pay. For this reason we re-estimate the DID regressions are considering the 
dependent variables in logarithms. In table 8 we report the DID estimates for the OOPECTP 
and OOPEs. Based on the DID coefficient in both cases the difference in the OOPECTP and 
OOPEs between the treated and control group is reduced respectively by 21 and 26 per cent.  
 
(Insert Table 8) 
(Insert Figures 1-6) 
 
However, we should notice that the study undergoes from major drawbacks. The first and 
more important disadvantage is the use of repeated cross-sectional data, where we are unable 
to follow the same individuals and households across time and therefore, this limitation does 
not allow us to include their history into a fixed effects model. Even thought, panel data 
models suffer more from attrition and non-response issues, relative to the cross-sectional 
surveys, still we cannot account for unobserved heterogeneity within and between the 
respondents. Second, PSM procedures rely on certain and strict assumptions, that we 
discussed earlier in the methodology section, which may not always hold.   
 
7. Conclusions  
 
The first aim of this study was to explore the most important factors that determine 
individuals’ and households’ capability of participating in a specific health insurance scheme. 
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Second, we have examined the effects of the health insurance types on OOPEs and 
OOPECTP. The findings show that in all cases, public health insurance offers a protection to 
the households regarding the OOPEs. In addition, those who are Green Card holders spend 
less on OOPEs in comparison with the uninsured people. Next, the study have explored the 
effects of the health reform in 2008, where Green Card holders are entitled to the same health 
services and benefits with the public health insurees. In addition, after 2008 there have been 
significant improvements on the infrastructure of health centres and a large expansion of the 
emergency services in the rural areas (OECD, 2008). The findings show that the health 
expenditures between the treated group-the Green Card holders- and the control group –public 
health insurance- are reduced. This indicates that the expansion of the Green Card scheme in 
2008 was a successful policy that has reduced the gap in the health expenditures. The results 
also show that besides the socio-economic characteristics that were examined in previous 
studies, such as age, employment and income among others, the accessibility level to health 
centres and transportation points is another critical factor. Since many people need a private 
transportation, when the accessibility to public transportation is difficult or inconvenient, and 
the distance to health centres and their accessibility level is low, the OOPEs are likely higher. 
Future research studies may explore the impact of the 2008 health reform on other outcomes, 
such as health status, standard of livings and well-being considering a group analysis, 
including gender, disabled and age groups.   
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Continuous Variables 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
Household Income 16,181.76 18,985.36 110 799,709.1  
OOPE 1,920.352 5,853.015 2.5 59,822  
OOPECTP 0.0385 0.0668 0 0.9303  
Age 39.433 16.560 16 99  
Household Size 2.4575 4.9598 1 16  
Categorical Variables 
 Male Female    
Gender 48.63 51.37    
 Public Private Green Card No Health 
insurance 
 
Health Insurance 63.09 6.76 13.24 16.91  
 Single Married Widowed/Widower Divorced  
Marital Status 28.95 64.98 4.76 1.31  
 Illiterate Literate-not 
completed school 
Primary School Primary 
Education 
Secondary 
School 
Education Level 11.25 21.94 31.74 8.66 5.74 
 High School Senior High 
School 
College University  
Education Level 10.16 4.19 2.06 4.25  
 Yes No    
Health Problems 5.26 94.74    
 Owner Tenant Lodging Other  
House Tenure 68.26 21.54 1.57 8.64  
 Yes No    
Employed 43.50 56.50    
 Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Easy Very Easy  
Access to Health 
centres 
7.73 22.88 54.32 15.07  
 Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Easy Very Easy  
Access to 
Transportation Points 
7.10 20.42 55.66 16.82  
 Urban Rural    
Area 65.98 34.02    
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 Public Health 
Insurance 
Private 
Health 
Insurance 
Green Card 
Holders 
No Health 
Insurance 
Household 
Income 
Education Household 
Size 
Private Health 
Insurance 
-0.3522*** 
(0.000) 
      
Green Card 
Holders 
-0.5107*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1052*** 
(0.000) 
     
No Health 
Insurance 
-0.5897*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1215*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1762*** 
(0.000) 
    
Household 
Income 
0.0413*** 
(0.000) 
0.0101*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0988*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0415*** 
(0.000) 
   
Education  0.2021*** 
(0.000) 
0.0034** 
(0.0432) 
-0.1999*** 
(0.0432) 
-0.0848*** 
(0.0432) 
0.2445*** 
(0.000) 
  
Household 
Size 
-0.3047*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.000) 
0.2402*** 
(0.000) 
0.1999*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0228*** 
(0.000) 
-0.2226*** 
(0.000) 
 
Urban Area 0.1822*** 
(0.000) 
0.0192*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1665*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1006*** 
(0.000) 
0.0991 
(0.000) 
0.1686*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1645** 
(0.000) 
P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3. Multinomial Logit Equations and Determinants of Different Types of Health Insurance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Private  Green Card No Insurance 
Gender (Female) 0.0358 -0.4623*** -0.4703*** 
 (0.0541) (0.0263) (0.0241) 
Age -0.01834*** -0.0218*** -0.0267*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Logarithm of Household Income - 0.3941*** -0.7882*** -0.4294*** 
 (0.0406) (0.0207) (0.0182) 
Marital Status (Never Married)    
Marital Status-Married  0.1874** -0.4317*** -0.7699*** 
 (0.0732) (0.0387) (0.0333) 
Marital Status-Widowed -0.3787** -0.2462*** -0.9910*** 
 (0.1743) (0.0643) (0.0741) 
Marital Status-Divorced 0.4311** 0.3551*** 0.3881*** 
 (0.1852) (0.0899) (0.0711) 
Education Level (reference Illiterate)     
Education Level-Not completed school 0.1246 -0.4248*** -0.1214** 
 (0.1210) (0.0446) (0.0542) 
Education Level-Primary School -0.0034 -0.9758*** -0.0927** 
 (0.0968) (0.0363) (0.0422) 
Education Level-Primary Education 0.0031 -1.3827*** -0.7979*** 
 (0.1303) (0.0535) (0.0555) 
Education Level-Secondary School -0.0219 -1.2864*** -0.1553*** 
 (0.1356) (0.0617) (0.0576) 
Education Level-High School  0.1870 -1.5654*** -0.2846*** 
 (0.1256) (0.0608) (0.0541) 
Education Level-Senior School -0.1413 -1.9004*** -0.4491*** 
 (0.1447) (0.0756) (0.0595) 
Education Level-College -0.2588 -2.5696*** -0.6321*** 
 (0.1891) (0.1557) (0.0799) 
Education Level-University 0.5348*** -2.9642*** -0.5965*** 
 (0.1332) (0.1711) (0.0727) 
Employed (No) -0.0572 0.2244*** 0.0134 
 (0.0539) (0.0265) (0.0253) 
Household Size 0.1119*** 0.2622*** 0.1478*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0055) (0.0054) 
Wealth -0.1079*** -0.5249*** -0.3189*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0096) (0.0099) 
Access to Health centres (reference very difficult)    
Access to Health centres-Difficult 0.0269 -0.1508** 0.0196 
 (0.1501) (0.0614) (0.0641) 
Access to Health centres-Easily -0.0109 -0.0877 0.0087 
 (0.1551) (0.0621) (0.0648) 
Access to Health centres-Very Easily 0.0935 -0.1860*** -0.0707 
 (0.1925) (0.0880) (0.0862) 
Access to Transportation Points (reference very difficult)    
Access to Transportation Points-Difficult  -0.1711 0.0821 -0.1203* 
 (0.1531) (0.0642) (0.0659) 
Access to Transportation Points-Easily -0.2941* -0.0141 -0.1237* 
 (0.1560) (0.0638) (0.0653) 
Access to Transportation Points-Very Easily -0.4016** -0.0932* -0.1736** 
 (0.1932) (0.0471) (0.0842) 
Urban Area -0.2335*** - 0.2913*** -0.1983*** 
 (0.0591) (0.0286) (0.0269) 
Observations 113,458   
Wald chi square 19,957.26 
[0.000] 
  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, p-values within brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Propensity Score and Average Treatment Effects on Health Expenditures and OOPECTP for 
Green Card and Public Health Insurance  
VARIABLES (1) 
OOPEs 
(2) 
OOPECTP 
Dummy-Green Card Vs Public 14.662*** 0.0057*** 
 (4.708) (0.0017) 
Gender (Female) 0.1934 0.0064*** 
 (0.1626) (0.0010) 
Age 0.1331* 0.0009 
 (0.0563) (0.0031) 
Logarithm of Household Income 10.302*** -0.0032** 
 (1.806) (0.0015) 
Marital Status (Never Married)   
Marital Status-Married  6.4621* -0.4317*** 
 (3.788) (0.0387) 
Marital Status-Widowed 5.6931 0.0137*** 
 (6.012) (0.0025) 
Marital Status-Divorced 21.675** 0.0168** 
 (10.1852) (0.0076) 
Education Level (reference Illiterate)    
Education Level-Not completed school 3.6112 -0.0096 
 (3.088) (0.0381) 
Education Level-Primary School 0.2839 -0.0018 
 (4.077) (0.0056) 
Education Level-Primary Education 3.7775 -0.0045 
 (6.288) (0.0051) 
Education Level-Secondary School -3.9010 -0.0102** 
 (5.408) (0.0043) 
Education Level-High School  1.5753 -0.0131*** 
 (7.783) (0.0021) 
Education Level-Senior School -5.5282 -0.0173*** 
 (6.997) (0.0028) 
Education Level-College 1.9397 -0.0078* 
 (5.748) (0.0043) 
Education Level-University 2.5914 -0.0183*** 
 (4.479) (0.0048) 
Employed (No) 2.6522** 0.0023** 
 (1.325) (0.0011) 
Household Size 0.6865*** 0.0009 
 (0.1808) (0.0014) 
Wealth 1.4566*** -0.0010*** 
 (0.3470) (0.0004) 
Urban Area -2.1622*** - 0.0074** 
 (0.0591) (0.0033) 
Observations 20,163 20,163 
R Square 0.1033  0.1061 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, p-values within brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5. Propensity Score and Average Treatment Effects on                                                            
OOPEs and OOPECTP for other Types of Health Insurance 
VARIABLES OOPEs OOPECTP 
Green Card Vs Public 14.662*** 0.0057*** 
 (4.708) (0.0017) 
 
No-Insurance Vs Public-Private 
 
6.6725*** 
 
0.0039*** 
 (1.141) (0.0008) 
 
Green Card Vs No-Insurance 
 
-12.409*** 
 
-0.0063*** 
 (2.191) (0.0016) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6. Test for Propensity Score before and After Matching 
 
Green Card Vs Public No Insurance Vs 
Public-Private 
Green Card Vs 
No-Insurance 
Gender 0.66 
(0.507) 
1.33   
(0.184) 
-0.86   
(0.391) 
Age -1.17 
(0.244) 
1.54   
(0.115) 
-1.51   
(0.123) 
Household Income -0.44 
(0.662) 
1.30   
(0.172) 
0.91   
(0.361) 
Marital Status -1.99* 
(0.092) 
-1.79*  
(0.073) 
-5.25   
(0.000) 
Education level 1.43 
(0.112) 
1.76**  
(0.081) 
-0.34   
(0.731) 
Employed -2.42** 
(0.024) 
-1.36   
(0.173) 
-0.31   
(0.759) 
Household Size 0.92 
(0.355) 
2.23   
(0.026) 
-1.61   
(0.108) 
Wealth 0.34  
 (0.732) 
1.02   
(0.293) 
-1.57   
(0.113) 
Urban area -0.96   
(0.338) 
1.17  
(0.266) 
2.00** 
(0.045) 
Standard Errors in parentheses, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. DID for OOPECTP and OOPEs and various cases 
 Coefficients  Coefficients 
Panel A: Green Card Vs Public 
Health and OOPECTP 
 Panel B: Green Card Vs Public 
Health and OOPEs 
 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for Public 
Health Insurance) 
0.0106 
(0.507) 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for 
Public1) Health Insurance 
19.944 
(17.002) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) -0.0783*** 
(0.0150) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) 27.540**  
(13.292) 
Treat*Post-Period -0.0294** 
(0.0142) 
Treat*Post-Period -34.691**  
(19.377) 
No. Observations 20,555 No. Observations 20,555 
R Square 0.1305 R Square 0.1427 
Panel C: Green Card Vs Public 
Health  Placebo OOPECTP test 
2007 
 Panel D: Green Card Vs Public 
Health  Placebo OOPEs test 
2007 
 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for Public 
Health Insurance) 
0.0043 
(0.106) 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for 
Public1) Health Insurance 
22.571  
(21.533) 
Post-Period (1 for 2007 and after) -0.0431*** 
(0.0113) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) 30.700  
(25.445) 
Treat*Post-Period -0.0058 
(0.0142) 
Treat*Post-Period -27.972  
(22.842) 
No. Observations 20,555 No. Observations 20,555 
R Square 0.0834 R Square 0.0729 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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Table 8. DID for Logarithms of OOPECTP and OOPEs 
 Coefficients  Coefficients 
Panel A: Green Card Vs Public 
Health and OOPECTP 
 Panel B: Green Card Vs Public 
Health and OOPEs 
 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for Public 
Health Insurance) 
0.0446 
(0.106) 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for 
Public1) Health Insurance 
0.1670 
(0.212) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) -0.1082*** 
(0.0310) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) 0.7074*  
(0.378) 
Treat*Post-Period  0.2129** 
(0.0982) 
Treat*Post-Period -0.2602**  
(0.130) 
No. Observations 19,798 No. Observations 19,798 
R Square 0.1266 R Square 0.8773 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 1. Parallel Trend Assumption for OOPEs 
 
Figure 2. Parallel Trend Assumption for OOPECTP 
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Figure 3. Histogram for OOPEs 
 
 
Figure 4. Histogram for Logarithm of OOPEs 
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Figure 5. Histogram for OOPEs over the Capacity to Pay 
 
 
Figure 6. Histogram for the Logarithm of OOPEs over the Capacity to Pay 
 
 
 
